An elusive general issue
Broad titles testify to the uncertainty of the author about the focus of his topic. The reasons are manifold. One is that, under Continental laws, rules against unfair competition relate to a wide range of trade practices. Deceptive advertising, passing off, counterfeit of non-protected product concepts and configurations, trade secret protection, interference with contractual relationships of all kinds (distribution systems, client or labor relations), disparagement of competitors, predatory practices (sales below costs, discrimination, tie-ins, boycotts etc.) are all practices may come under the heading of unfair competition. All, in one way or the other, concern free competition, the protection of which is the concern of the antitrust laws. Most but not all of these practices do have something to do with freedom of choice in competition.
But again, freedom of choice might define the areas of their overlap rather than offer a general dividing line for the application of either of the two sets of rules. Another, related reason for the elusive character of the topic is that, on the Continent, the law of unfair competition has a much longer and more deeply rooted tradition than has antitrust law. In Germany, it preceded the latter by half a century or more, 1 and it developed from general tort law, of which it still forms a part, at least in some countries. In fact, in the absence of antitrust laws, rules against unfair competition have been relied upon to fight anticompetitive practices, such as group or the abusive exercise of market power, and it still remains rather unclear whether other predatory practices are unfair, anticompetitive or both.
Yet another reason for a hesitant approach to the topic is that, at least in Germany, it relates to a generation old controversy over the interdependent goals and overlapping areas of application of the rules against unfair practices in competition and the rules against practices that are restrictive of competition. To the extent that this debate turns on issues of qualifying business conduct as either anticompetitive or unfair, and of determining the relative importance of the safeguard of the freedom to compete and the proper definition of the standards of how to compete, it may be altogether fruitless. Both issues may present only particular aspects of the overall problem of "civilizing" competition by legal rules. 3 The debate may also be an endless story. Competition policy, or more precisely, the orientation of the application of the antitrust laws, has changed considerably over the last decades, and it may continue to change despite our present reliance on the (welfare) economics approach of current mainstream economic and political thinking. 4 Likewise, the interpretation of the aims and functions of the law against unfair competition has been subject to permanent change, not only in view of enhanced consumer protection, but also precisely in view of the same revision of the concept of competition which the antitrust laws are supposed to protect.
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The result was a certain "deregulation" of unfair competition law, which, by doing away with, inter alia, limitations on pricing policy, 6 made it clear that the purpose of unfair competition law is not 2 First based on general principles of tort law relating to "unethical" conduct, see Reichsgericht of June 25, 1890, RGZ 28, 238 (collective boycott to enforce resale price maintenance system in the book trade), subsequently on the basis of Section 1 UWG, see A. Baumbach, W. Hefermehl, Wettbewerbsrecht, 21 st ed. Munich 1999, § 1 annot. 282 et seq. with references. 3 See for such an indeterminate in-pari-materiae approach recently Beater, loc. cit., p. 31 et seq. (also p. 718 et seq.); for a general discussion see A. Baumbach, W. Hefermehl, loc. cit., sub Allg., annot 84, 86 et seq.; W. Schünemann in Großkommentar UWG, loc. cit. Einl. E 7 et seq.. 4 For additional objectives influencing competition policy in practice see references infra n. 23. 5 The evolving views on the concepts of competition and of the relevant objectives of the antitrust laws, which have been discussed broadly enough in relation to the -policy guided -implementation of the EU competition rules (see Ph 1969, 1, 4 et seq., was to the effect that Member State authorities were free to subject restrictive practices to stricter national antitrust law unless the Commission, which in that respect had exclusive jurisdiction, had exempted the practice from the application of Article 81 (1) EC-Treaty by an affirmative act (decision or regulation). Article 3 Reg. 1/2003 now excludes any application of stricter national law, i.e. both Article 81 (1) and (3) always take precedence, see E. Rebinder, Zum Verhältnis zwischen nationalem und EG-Kartellrecht "Member States shall not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged in by undertakings".
This exception mainly relates to national rules on competition which enjoin enterprises from abusing the relational market power which they may enjoy vis-à-vis economically dependent enterprises. 9 Typically, such abuses would consist in refusals to deal, or in discriminatory or predatory practices, which arguably may also be outlawed by the rules against unfair competition.
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If so, we might ask why there is a need for this exception.
This question is even more justified as Article 3(3) provides for a second exception that:
"without prejudice to general principles and other provisions of Community law, paragraphs 1 and 2 (of Article 3) do not ...... preclude the application of provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an objective different from that pursued by Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty". This rule is explained by the recitals of Reg. 1/2003 in the following terms:
(9) Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty have as their objective the protection of competition on the market. This Regulation, which is adopted for the implementation of these Treaty provisions, does not preclude Member States from implementing on their territory national legislation, which protects other legitimate interests provided that such legislation is compatible with general principles and other provisions of Community law. Insofar as such national legislation pursues predominantly an objective different from that of protecting competition on the market, the competition authorities and courts of the Member States may apply such legislation on their territory. Accordingly, Member States may under this Regulation implement on their territory national legislation that prohibits or imposes sanctions on acts of unfair trading practice, be they unilateral or contractual. Such legislation pursues a specific objective, irrespective of the actual or presumed effects of such acts on competition on the market. This is particularly the case of legislation which prohibits undertakings from imposing on their trading partners, obtaining or attempting to obtain from them terms and conditions that are unjustified, disproportionate or without consideration.
This authentic clarification of the legislative rationale of Article 3(3) certainly is less clear than the concept underlying the exception rule of Article 3(2). The latter simply is a rule attributing competence in antitrust matters: the "big" cases are to be controlled by the competition rules of the Community, the "small" cases are left to control by national competition law, as, indeed control over the exercise of relational market power mostly (though not necessarily) is intended to protect small and medium-sized enterprises.
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Article 3(2) thus essentially leaves competition policy regarding small industry to Member States as a matter of some sort of a principle of subsidiarity.
Article 3(3), by contrast, establishes a line of delimitation between the antitrust laws and other rules of market regulation which is based on the objective pursued by such rules, namely not to regulate the effects of competition on the market. Moreover, with respect to unfair trading practices, the legislator specifies that control remains within the authority of Member States because (and to the extent that) it is exercised "irrespective of the actual or presumed effects of such acts on competition on the market". This is a surprising limitation of the reach of the Community's control over competition. It is correct that the antitrust laws may be identified by their objective of protecting competition on the market. However, it is difficult to believe that the Community legislature really intended to accept all national legislation, which, with a view to protecting honest trade, qualifies trade practices as unfair practices, simply because it does so irrespective of the positive or negative effects which such practices have on competition. Most likely the effect of outlawing such practices will be to distort or impair, or at least to affect competition in one way or the other. In this respect, the reservation made in favor of "the general principles and other provisions of Community law", though necessary, if not self-evident, will not suffice to prevent "protectionist" national laws. By definition, those other principles and provisions only guarantee a baseline of Community compatibility, but not compatibility with competition rules. A more plausible dividing line, therefore, might be 11 Section 20 (2) (3) (4) GWB originally protected any enterprise against the abusive exercise of relational market power, but once it had fulfilled its basic function of opening distribution systems to non-specialized retail chains, was reduced to protecting only small and medium-sized enterprises, i.e. its underlying policy was readjusted, see K. As an organization of regional economic integration, the European Community is based on a Common Market, which over the years, and as a matter of strategic policy, has become ever more akin to a genuine "Internal Market". Rome as a means both of safeguarding the integration process against private interests (which, instead of exploiting the integration potential, would tend to (re)segregate markets with a view to benefit from profit differentials) and of establishing and maintaining a system of undistorted competition per se. It is the latter objective which, given the completion of the Internal Market, has become the guiding concept for the implementation of the competition rules as they apply to restrictive agreements and concerted practices ( in the name of the rationality of the free enterprise system, pass rather than be enjoined.
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The consequences of this economics based approach reach far beyond the substantive divide between, on the one hand, vertical and horizontal agreements -in the absence of market power, i.e. if inter-brand competition is effective, vertical agreements enhance competitiveness of "brand owners", whereas horizontal agreements always have a potential for collusion -, and, on the other, hardcore and those other restrictions, which are not consistently harmful. Thus, on the level of policy objectives, welfare economics are ill-suited to accommodate competing societal objectives, be they market-related or not.
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In the first case, they only carry with them losses, in the second, the gains appear to be elusive at best, and in all cases, they imply normative judgements, which may better be made as a matter of determining the framework regulation of the market, since they cannot consistently be incorporated into the assessment of the competitive process as such. Therefore, welfare maximization is claimed to be an overriding goal, and other objectives are, at least in theory, relegated to a secondary level and always subject to controversy, whatever their status is under the Treaty. The next question then is to what extent the standards for qualifying competitive conduct as being unfair are also affected.
The impact of the "more economics based" approach of EU competition policy on the order and the style of competition is likely to make itself ever more felt. Thus, on the level of enforcement, the efficiency gains or losses, which, under the more economics based approach, determine the antitrust-law fate of a business arrangement, can be plausibly affirmed, examined and confirmed only if sufficiently detailed factual knowledge about the operation and the effects of the arrangement on the market is available. As this will normally be the case more easily for hardcore restrictions than for non-hardcore restrictions, 27 the latter tend to pass particularly easily not only on the basis of a rule of doubt, but also as a matter of bringing the potential for pro-competitive effects to bear, which they may hold. This is all the more so as the transition from an ex-ante to an ex-post control, 28 which the more economics based approach requires, 29 if it is not to become a disincentive, must focus on the reality of that potential rather than on the eventual failure to realize it. II) . 29 Merger control represents a common (but no necessary) exception to this principle, see Article 4 Reg. 139/2004, the reason being that structural redress ex post is both too difficult and too costly. 30 The problem has been addressed partially by Commission, Guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements, loc. cit. sub no. 73 et seq.; and more fully by id., Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty, hardcore restrictions will only raise problems of evidence, rather than of factual economic evaluation, procedural law supports what is the express policy orientation of the more economics based approach, namely -in the interest of international competitiveness -the exploitation of whatever efficiency potential there may be at whatever organization of competition short of outright cartelization.
b) Control of market power and of public enterprises
Due to the liberalization of the public sector, in particular in the field of telecommunication and energy supply but also of certain infrastructure facilities for sea or air transportation, the market principle of a competition-driven realization of whatever potential there is for efficiency gains, and as a result, for welfare maximization, has become ever more pervasive in the EU.
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The lever for this transformation has been a broad application of Article 86 of the Treaty. . In addition, as ex post control can only seek to compensate for harm done (rather than prevent it), it will be effective only where the harm is identifiable, which is more likely for hardcore restrictions than for other agreements that merely do not hold their promises,i.e. which really are or which have become inefficient. 31 See for the resulting reduction to group-or pole-centric competition H. Ullrich 1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89. 2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community. 3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member States. 34 Article 82 reads: enforcement of access to markets which have not been or which have not been adequately served by the public entity. Concomitantly, Article 82 of the Treaty has been applied to the private sector as well whenever competition in new, adjacent or in up-or down-stream markets depended on access to essential facilities. 35 The risk that either such an interpretation of Article 82 EC-Treaty or, on the contrary, its reading as a rule of equity rather than of preservation of competition as such, ultimately might result in applying the Article so as to frustrate a market dominating enterprise's interest in enhancing its efficiency or, for that matter, the interest of any enterprise to become market dominating by superior efficiency, is now advanced as a reason to limit the applicability of Article 82 EG-Treaty in accordance with a "more economics based approach".
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Whatever the merits of this argument and its consistency with the use of Article 82 within the framework of Article 86 EC-Treaty may be, the tendency again is that of orienting the competition order so as to satisfy the efficiency claims of the monopolist rather than freedom of competition and of choice of all market participants.
National Antitrust Laws
Over the last 10 to 15 years, Member States of the European Union, which did not already have a developed system of antitrust law, introduced rules on competition for enterprises essentially modeled on the Community's system. Even Member States with a proper tradition of controlling restrictive business practices, such as France, Germany, and the United Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 35 The essential-facilities doctrine probably has become the most discussed competition law doctrine of the last decade, for an overview see even with respect to interstate transactions. Their main thrust is on protecting small and medium sized industry against discriminatory refusals to deal and predatory pricing practices of various kinds. However, they are rather akin, if not identical to rules of unfair competition laws directed at discriminatory and predatory practices, and, therefore will be dealt with separately. The development and application of these principles has resulted in an extremely rich case law ensuring both a broad liberalization of trade, and the safeguard of basic public interests of Member States, including new public interest policies in the areas of protection of the consumers or of the environment. It is, of course, far from being uncontroversial. As regards national laws against unfair competition, the controversies, however, mainly concern an area, which is of less interest here, namely that of consumer protection against the various forms of misleading advertising, marketing, and product labeling. advertising, namely the introduction by judicial fiat of the European "model consumer". 42 The determination of the fairness or unfairness of the means chosen when competing for the consumer thus is no longer a matter alone of honesty in trade, whatever its proper definition in general and its determination by law in particular may be .Rather it is also a matter of policy regarding the nature and scope of competition, which is desired in view of a specific public interest. 43 In the absence of harmonization of national unfair competition laws, however, such policy orientation of the application of free trade principles to national rules against unfair competition may have to give way to legitimate national policies regarding the definition of what is unfair competition. Thus, the Court has not hesitated in approving of unfair competition remedies which are directed against imports of slavish imitations of products which, as such, are not domestically protected by any intellectual property right. In this case, the acceptable national justification has been that such protection would serve to protect the consumer and to promote honest trade, both of which are in the general interest, and, in addition, supported by principles of international treaty law. 44 However, the conflict does not disappear.
Indeed the Court's concern for market integration has again been a controlling element in cases where the plaintiff sought to protect its distribution system against parallel trade by relying on principles of unfair competition law. These may make the parallel trader, who has obtained the goods in question from sources who were in breach of contract or whom he induced to breach contract, a dishonest trader, thus giving privity relations a sort of in rem effect. The Court did not have to examine fully the legitimacy of these principles of unfair competition law under the Treaty's rules on free trade. However, it made it clear that, under both the rules on competition and the rules on free movement of goods, 45 contractual arrangements will be subject to Community control, where, according to national unfair law, 42 (parallel) trade with goods resulting from a simple breach of such contractual arrangements would be held to amount, without more, to unfair trade. This case law, however, is neither very developed nor entirely clear. For one thing, whilst taking account of the support, which unfair competition law may give to contractual relations, seems to be entirely justified as a matter of correctly applying the rules on competition, it is unclear how free movement principles may at all control the legality of contractual arrangements. 46 For another, the Court has laid down arms when requested to rule on the compatibility with free trade principles of the major means of controlling contractual distribution arrangements, which is the serial numeration of goods.
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Asked whether the removal of such numeration may be justified in the interest of free trade, the Court answered that all depends on the objectives that are served by numeration. In particular, if it served several objectives -such as control of both product quality and of distribution channels -, then the parallel trader is referred to the uncertainties of a relief he may obtain by application of the antitrust laws.
Both the relationship between the rules against restrictive practices and the rules against unfair competition, and the limits of using free trade principles as a means to control national unfair competition law, became apparent when the Court was asked to rule on the compatibility of national unfair competition laws with free trade as they apply to pricing policies of enterprises. In a first approach, the Court accepted the legitimacy of subjecting imports of goods from other Member States to national rules prohibiting "gifts coupled to the sale of goods, even if such sales promotion practices were held to be legal in the country of origin.
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In the Court's view, the national legislator might reasonably be concerned with the risk of the consumer being misled as to the true price/quality relationship of the main product, and of competition on the merits being distorted by enterprises offering goods for no or an excessively small consideration. 46 was not the contract as such that was judged against free trade principles, but the combined effect of contractual and statutory obligations, the rules against unfair competition giving an absolute (in rem) effect to the contract, which, in turn, means that parties may trigger such absolute effects (of territorial segregation) by contract. This is a phenomenon, which is know from license contracts, where parties may, by agreement, create limitations of the license contract which have an in rem effect, and, therefore, may be subject to scrutiny under About ten years later, however, the Court refused even to examine under free trade principles national rules on unfair competition, which outlawed sales below costs or at excessively low prices. 49 The judgment in Keck et Mithouard represents a landmark decision in that it redefined the scope of application of free trade principles to national market regulations by excluding regulations of modalities of sales from Community control, provided they are nondiscriminatory by nature,. As such, it may be explained as an exercise of judicial self-restraint or as a refusal to develop the Treaty's free trade principles into a fundamental rights principle of free enterprise. 50 In terms of substantive law, however, it may also be explained as an effort to draw a dividing line between the Community's power to control national unfair competition law, and its claim to primacy of its rules on competition with respect to pricing policies of enterprises. Indeed, given the close relationship between the rules against restrictive practices and the rules against unfair practices of competition, why should the Court admit primacy of Community law on the basis of principles that are so ill-suited to do justice to the various circumstantial particularities of competition cases -whether relating to restrictive or to unfair practices -as are the principles of free trade in goods or services? 51 In addition, why should it do so before a preliminary question has been answered, namely that of whether or not Community law would take precedence anyway by virtue of its rules of competition. This question, in its turn, can be answered properly only once the true relationship between the rules against restrictive practices and the rules against unfair practices has been determined.
Indeed, a claim to priority may be asserted only to the extent that both set of rules actually may enter into conflict.
b) Harmonization of national law
Harmonization of national laws on unfair competition essentially has been a matter of developing and implementing a Community policy on consumer protection. It focused on establishing Community-wide rules on misleading and deceptive advertising, the extent of such reliance. The Internal Market approach apparently is to leave it at that, meaning that regulatory competition between Member States would determine the development of unfair competition law within the Community. By contrast, under thepresently prevailing -consumer-protection approach, consumer-related unfair competition law would be fully harmonized so as to leave no room for additional national protection, 58 whereas competitor-related unfair competition law, just as under the Internal Market approach, would be largely left to regulatory competition.
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For awhile, both approaches seemed likely to be adopted simultaneously on the assumption that they are mutually complementary rather than exclusive.
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Whilst such coexistence apparently is no longer politically desired, it still remains that harmonization will be full and comprehensive with respect to consumer-related unfair business practices, the principle of the country of origin having been abandoned in the legislative process.
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In legal terms, this change of principle is not altogether meaningless. It entails a change of the applicable law, which will be that of the market place where the consumer buys rather than that of the place of production, and thus is in better conformity with reliance on proper information as the main principle of consumer protection.
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In economic terms, however, it will not make much difference, if any. To be sure, as regards the level of consumer protection, a definite limit will be set to any race to the bottom that may be inherent in regulatory 58 For the full-harmonization effect see Commission, Proposal for a Directive concerning unfair business-toconsumer commercial practices, loc. cit., Article 4 (2), recitals 2, 4, 8, and explicitly the Explanatory Memorandum, ibid. sub No. 30; more clearly Article 3 (5) of the " Common Position " by the Council of November 15,2004 (CONSOM 63/MI 215/CODEC 929, Inter-institutional File 2003/0134 (COD)), which, for an additional period of 6 years, accepts divergent national laws, and also ibid. recital 6,11,12,13. 59 See Article 1 and recital 5 of Commission, Proposal for a Directive concerning unfair business to-consumer practices, loc. cit.; however, Article 14 provides for some minimum protection against competitor-related unfair trade practices in that it maintains Directives 450/1984 and 55/1997 on misleading and comparative advertising as they apply to competitive relationships between traders. Whether these rules may be read and applied in the same way as the corresponding rules of consumer protection even if Member States do not expressly provide for such parallelism as a matter of granting more than minimal protection, remains to be seen. Clearly, however, aggressive practices are outside the realm of the minimum protection of competitors by Community law. 60 competition. 63 But the beneficial effects, which are expected from adherence to the principle of the country of origin, equally will be obtained, since full harmonization likewise guarantees an efficient territorial allocation of production, increased economics of scale and reduced transaction costs as enterprises do not have to observe the manufacturing and marketing rules of by 25 Member States. In addition, the liberalization effects will also take place as originally intended. Enterprises will indeed enjoy more autonomy as regards the choice of the ways and means of defining and presenting their offer, since, just as under the principle of the country of origin, the "benchmark" consumer will be the informed average consumer, 64 and since the guiding principle of protection is that of guaranteeing an informed, economically rational choice of the consumer acting as an "economic agent in a competitive EU". 65 Clearly, under such an approach to consumer protection against unfair marketing practices, modes of competition will change as the margin of acceptable conduct becomes broader and competitive aggressiveness more readily tolerated. 64 Originally, Article 2 lit.b Commission, Proposal for a Directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer practices , loc. cit. expressly referred to the " reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect 2 " average consumer ". Whilst this reference has been deleted, and even an exception introduced Article 5(3) relating to practices , which specifically concern particularly vulnerable groups of consumers ) the substance of the average-consumer approach has been retained , see recital 18 of the " Common Position ", loc. (available at http://europe.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_pract/speeches); in fact, from the documents of the Commission it appears that it is less the need to protect the consumer than the wish to stimulate her/him to act as a catalyst for interstate trade that motivates the proposals for reform, see Commission, Proposal for a Directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer practices, loc. cit., Explanatory Memorandum, No. 6 et seq.. 
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Whilst the first harmonization directive of 1984 was limited to the rules against misleading advertising as a matter of political self restraint and feasibility, and whilst it clearly was motivated by considerations of consumer protection, it still recognized that protection against misleading advertising also served fairness as between competitors. Community law -a limitation on the value of a sales promotion, except for discounts on fixed-price products and sales below costs -a prohibition on discounts preceding seasonal sales, or -a requirement to obtain prior authorization, or any requirement having equivalent effect, for the use or commercial communication of a sales promotion and, instead, provide for an obligation to give information about the nature and scope of the sales promotion activity. 70 Supra n. 59; Commission, Proposal for a Directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices (as modified by the "political agreement" of the Council) loc. cit. recital 5a admonishes the Commission to "carefully examine the need for Community action in the field of unfair competition beyond the remit of the Directive". This admonition, however, is not retained by recital 17a) and Article 17a which provide for mandatory review of the Directive. 71 Commission, Proposal for a Directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices (as modified by the "Common Position" of the Council), loc. cit., recital 8 expressly recognizes indirect effects of protection of competitors. 72 Article 11 (1) Commission Proposal for a Directive concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, loc. cit., provides for a right of action of competitors in case consumer interests are violated. The competitor at the rescue of consumer interests rather than at the defense of his/her own interest? How to plausibly and effectively claim the violation of a rule, which expressly is not intended to protect the claimant? Does the standing to sue include claims for losses suffered by consumers? Under German law a competitor genuinely own competitive interests. 73 Rather, the definition of what and how much (indirect) protection they may benefit of is made dependent on which and how much of the interests of consumers enjoy protection, since this is the point of reference against which unfairness is to be assessed. Such a consumer bias of protection ultimately may result in yet another distortion of the process of competition.
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In addition, by leaving inter-enterprise trading relations unattended, Community law creates a two-tier level of fairness within the overall system of competition, thus again enhancing aggressiveness.
Second, with respect to the latter concern of protecting enterprises at least against the cruder forms of deceptive and aggressive practices, harmonization will remain minimal, would not even have the right to claim his own damages if the law is not intended to protect his interests (Section 823 (2) BGB). 73 Thus, the award of damages for losses suffered by competitors rather than by the consumers becomes a matter of doubt, because, even if, as a matter of standing, national rules of enforcement will allow competitors to sue for damages, granting such damages in excess of consumer losses might be in conflict with the maximum harmonization principle, which precisely is aimed at limiting protection so as to avoid additional burdens on cross-border competition. 74 A case illustrating the multiplicity of interests and the potential for a biased balance is CJEC of October 25, 2001, case C-112/99, Toshiba Europe/Katun, supra 66. The risk, of course, is greatest where competitors do not enjoy any "parallel protection", e.g. in case of aggressive commercial practices. 75 respect to the treatment of discriminatory and predatory practices and its relationship to the protection of smalland-medium sized industry infra III.3. 80 See for an overview G. Schricker, F. Henning-Bodewig, loc. cit. WRP 2001 at 1368; as regards Germany in particular, the new "Act Against Unfair Competition" of July 3, 2004 (BGB 2004 I 1414), which is intended to modernize the law in anticipation of EU harmonization, expressly provides in Section 1 that the "Act serves to protect competitors, consumers and other market participants against unfair competition. It concomitantly protects the public's interest in undistorted competition". 81 Article 1 Directive 1984/450, loc. cit. reads: "The purpose of this Directive is to protect consumers, persons carrying on a trade or business or practicing a craft or a profession, and the interests of the public in general against misleading advertising and the unfair consequences thereof". 82 Supra I.2.
III. A Community Role for National Rules against Unfair Competition

1.
Community Protection of Competition, National Protection of Competitors?
The overall picture of the relationship between the antitrust rules and the anti-unfair competition rules in the Community thus is somewhat intriguing. On the one hand, the Community, in the interest of enhancing the international competitiveness of its industry in an era of globalization of trade and competition and by a reaction in regulatory competition to the US-example, has reformed the substance of its rules on restraints of competition and obliged Member States to follow it closely. By the same token, the Community has rearranged its enforcement system and integrated Member States authorities and courts into it.
However, it expressly left Member States' related systems of granting enterprises protection against unfair business practices of competitors and other enterprises unaffected. On the other hand, the Community, for the sake of stimulating integration and reinforcing the Internal Market, has harmonized national rules against unfair commercial practices as they occur in business-to-consumer relations. In order to achieve its objectives it has invited, if not instrumentalized consumers to behave as economic actors and as legal activists, and it has reduced the role of enterprises to act as purely system-determined competitors. True, they may bring actions for violation of the law. However, like under the antitrust rules, they may not do so in their individual interest and as a matter of their own substantive entitlement, but only in the interest of the system, so to speak as a public interest derivative suit. question is one of the proper configuration of the competition system in the Community, and clearly, therefore, it cannot be dealt with here in full. 84 However, by way of illustration, three areas of rules may be shortly examined -for lack of better knowledge by reference to German law.
The selection is, of course, purposive, but may be controversial. Thus, rules of unfair competition law, which protect an enterprise's innovative achievements, may be considered to be constitutive of dynamic competition (sub. a), whereas rules on the protection against interference with contractual relations (sub. b) might be held to be a source of potential conflict with principles of free competition. Finally, rules on predatory or discriminatory conduct could be complementary to antitrust law principles or converge with them (sub c).
a) Safeguard of trade secrets and non-IPR protected innovations
Under national law, trade secrets are protected not only as a matter of contract law as it applies to -explicit or implicit -confidentiality agreements, but also as a matter of protection against unfair business practices. Note that direct conflicts between the Community's rules on competition and national laws on unfair competition are to be solved by the principle of primacy of Community law (see A. Beater, Unlauterer Wettbewerb, oc. cit. at p. 158 et seq.), but mostly the question precisely will be whether there actually is such a conflict (see infra sub b, c)). The answer to that question, however, is but the smaller part of the problem of the role of unfair competition law in the overall competition system as established and governed by the Community. 85 See Section 17 et seq. German Act Against Unfair Competition (supra n. 80). 86 See Article 39, note 10 TRIPs-Agreement. agreements protecting know how, and, in accordance with national antitrust laws, even treats restrictive know how licensing in the same way as it treats restrictive patent licensing. 89 This is not the place to re-examine that position, and the less so as the importance of protecting trade secrets by way of the rules against unfair competition may have diminished due to that much know how nowadays takes the forms of computer programs or databases and, consequently, is protected as such, i.e. by exclusive rights. 90 Rather, the point precisely is that, with respect to trade secrets, the potential for conflict between the rules against unfair business practices and the antitrust laws has been reduced, or for that matter, elevated to the level of the relationship between intellectual property and competition law. and (useful) designs, may have reduced the need for such protection, the claim is raised frequently and under various circumstances, for example after the lapse of intellectual property protection, if such protection has not been applied for in the first place, or more precisely in case of unavailability of specific protection. 93 Courts and doctrine in the various Member States have reacted differently to such claims, a major limiting argument being that, in view of an optimal dissemination and use of innovations, the limits of intellectual property protection must also define the area of free imitation and of free competition. 94 The European Union, when harmonizing national intellectual property law, has given short shrift of this fundamental principle. Indeed, when harmonizing national intellectual property law, the Community has consistently allowed Member States to alternatively or cumulatively apply their laws on unfair competition as a way of protecting the subject matter of harmonized intellectual property. 95 The implication of this permissive approach is that Member States remain free not only to put unfair competition rules of protection on top of IPR-protection, but to extend protection by unfair competition law to all sorts of achievements.
Germany, in particular, has a long tradition of affording, on the basis of its "Law Against Unfair Competition", "supplementary protection for achievements in competition" to all kinds of technical and non-technical accomplishments of enterprises. Case law is highly developed and refined, but precisely "casuistic" rather than principled. 96 However, the starting points for judicial analysis of claims to protection are clear: Protection is not granted for the achievement as such, the subject matter of a successful industrial accomplishment. Rather it is granted as a remedy against specific forms of misappropriation of another enterprise's accomplishments in competition. 97 In that respect, it is not the investments made for or the efforts spent on such accomplishments that determine protection, but the conduct of the defendant and the manner of misappropriation. These must show the hallmark of unfairness.
Thus, a distinction is made between imitation by reverse engineering and simple counterfeit, the latter having little justification, at least not if alternative designs are easily available. But there must also be additional elements of unfairness, such as a risk of deception of consumers in case the accomplishment in question is generally attributed to a specific enterprise, or a risk of reputational damage, or an act of infiltration in and free ride on a rival's product line, in particular if this consists of assembly kits or like products, or some breach of confidence and so on. Some of these criteria are highly controversial or no longer applicable, such as sale of the infringing goods at cut prices. 98 But the overall picture that emerges is that of a case law which originates from an extension of protection against passing-off practices of competitors (a classical case of unfair competition). That case law is now is based on a concept of competition on the merits in that only individual achievements of enterprises are protected, and in that rival enterprises are required to undertake their own individual efforts, and to take risks rather than a free ride. 99 Thus, the underlying idea is to promote dynamic competition by innovation and differentiation rather than imitative price competition. This is an aspect of competition, which is not covered by the Community's directives on unfair competition law, which are orientated toward price competition, and it is definitely left to legal implementation by Member States by the Community's rules of harmonization in the field of intellectual property.
100
The antitrust laws certainly protect innovative competition, even if based on subject matter, which is not protected by intellectual property.
101
In fact, under the antitrust laws, the form of protection does not matter anyway.
102
One of the commonly accepted justifications for the misappropriation rules of unfair competition law is its case-specificity, and, therefore, its flexibility and suitability as a testing ground for new needs for protection.
The antitrust laws probably will respect this more easily than claims of antitrust immunity based on the rigidity of exclusive intellectual property rights.
103 98 See Th. Sambuc, loc. cit. at 168 et seq.. 99 Note that this catchword, like that of "competition on the merits", invites circular arguments. A "free ride" becomes an argument only once it is shown that the object of the ride is not free, but belongs or is attributed for exploitation to somebody else. Basically, free rides are in the interest of the dissemination of innovations, and may even be desirable as a matter of law, e.g. once the term of protection of patents or designs has lapsed, see BGH of December 8, 1999, supra n. 94. 100 See supra n. 95. 101 See OLG Hamburg of April 8, 1976, WuWE OLG 1724; U. Immenga in U. Immenga, E.-J. Mestmäcker, GWB, loc. cit. § 1 annot 157. 102 See references supra n. 91. 
b) Protecting contractual feudality arrangements
An example of a more direct influence of the interdependency between the rules against unfair competition and the antitrust laws is presented by the treatment of what may be assimilated to contractual feudality arrangements. 104 Most prominent in this respect are selective distribution systems, which manufacturers of branded goods establish in order to be able to control the channels of distribution of their products, and, thereby, to maintain reputation and appeal. In many countries, and in Germany in particular, unfair competition law affords additional tort law protection for these arrangements in that parallel traders are held liable of acts of unfair competition if they seek to obtain supplies for their "grey" trade either by way of inducing dealers, who are integrated into the system, into breach of contract or by way of exploiting a breach of contract or, finally, by way of covertly acquiring the branded goods. If such is the case, parallel traders may be enjoined from continuing to sell the products in parallel, and they are held liable to the damages caused to the manufacturer of the branded goods.
105
The result, of course, is the stabilization and sclerosis of the distribution system due to the exclusion of intra-brand competition on the retail level. As is well known, antitrust law doctrine and practice largely tolerate these vertical restraints on the assumption that, if inter-brand competition is effective, then they can do no harm. The European Union has also adopted this approach by granting, by way of a Commission regulation, by integrated dealers is no longer held to constitute an act of unfair competition. 107 The reason is that this would amount both to give contractual obligations an in rem-effect vis-à-vis third parties, and to unduly burden trade, the parallel trade being unable to tell from the goods whether they are properly or improperly released for trade. Second, to be unfair, an inducement into breach of contract recently has been held to require more than simply a request for supply from an integrated dealer, namely some additional elements of "inducing" the supplier, such as a promise of indemnification should the dealer be sued for breach of contract by the manufacturer.
108
Whilst such a requirement of "qualified" inducement into breach of contract appears to be perfectly justified, in practice it means that the manufacturer must overcome a heavier burden of demonstration and proof when trying to block-off parallel traders. The simple fact that the parallel trader approaches integrated dealers or is in possession of improperly traded goods no longer makes him act improperly. Thus, the combined grip of antitrust law and unfair competition law has been somewhat loosened on the side of the latter so as to give back to the consumer at least a small part of the freedom of choice, which antitrust law nowadays tends to neglect.
c) Fighting discrimination and predatory practices
At first sight, discrimination in business relations and predatory practices present typical cases of overlap between the rules against unfair competition and the rules against restrictive business practices. Thus, in Germany boycotts and price-cutting have indeed come under 107 BGH of December 1 st , 1999, WuW DE-R 493; the decision must be read in the context set by CJEC of October 27, 1993, case C-376/92, Metro-SB-Großmärkte/Cartier, Rep. 1994 I 15, no. 18 et seq.. Given the considerably different terms of protection which selective distribution system enjoyed under the various national laws against unfair competition, the Court held, that, to be lawful under Article 81 of the Treaty, a selective distribution system, if practiced without discrimination in the EU, does not need to be watertight as regards risks of parallel imports from outside the EU, the rationale being that otherwise less restrictive distribution system would fare worse than watertight systems. This antitrust liberalism required corresponding liberalism on the side of the law against unfair competition. For an overall analysis of these developments see A. Bergmann, Selektive Vertriebsbindungssysteme im Lichte der kartell-und lauterkeitsrechtlichen Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs und des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, ZWeR 2004, 28. Note that respect of selective distribution systems still may be controlled strictly on the basis of serial numbers: a dealer who deletes them or buys and resells good with deleted serial numbers will be held liable for unfair competition, see BGH, loc. cit. et p. 499; and see CJEC, supra n. 47, which unfortunately did not limit liability for the removal of serial numbers to precisely those losses which a manufacturer legitimately sought to prevent by serial numerotation. 108 Nevertheless, the purpose to protect both competition as such and the boycotted enterprise is more definitely confirmed by section 21 than by section 1 UWG, which applies also to practices inviting consumers to boycott certain sources of supply. (1) GWB reads: "Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall not request another undertaking or other associations of undertakings to refuse to sell or purchase, with the intention of unduly harming undertakings". Under Section 1 UWG, the intent to harm specific other enterprises is not a prerequisite of unfairness of boycotts, but it will rarely ever be missing. 112 In 1973, this prohibition was extended to enterprises holding relational market power vis-à-vis dependent enterprises, i.e. vis-à-vis suppliers or retailers. Originally, the reason for extending the non-discrimination rule was essentially to give non-specialized traders, such as supermarket chains and cash-and-carry dealers, access to the distribution of high brand products in such sectors as consumer electronics, sports equipment or luxury goods etc. 115 Subsequently, however, when those retail forms had become more firmly established and began to themselves hold considerable purchasing power vis-à-vis the supply industry, the rule has been limited to protect only small and medium sized industries. (2) Subsection (1) shall apply also to undertakings and associations of undertakings insofar as small or mediumsized enterprises as suppliers or purchasers of certain kinds of goods or commercial services depend on them in such a way that sufficient or reasonable possibilities of resorting to other undertakings do not exist. A supplier of a certain kind of goods or commercial services shall be presumed to depend on a purchaser within the meaning of sentence 1 if this purchaser regularly obtains from this supplier, in addition to discounts customary in the trade or other remuneration, special benefits which are not granted to similar purchasers. (3) Dominant undertakings and associations of undertakings within the meaning of subsection (1) shall not use their market position to cause other undertakings in business activities to grant them preferential terms without any objective justification. Sentence 1 shall apply also to undertakings and associations of undertakings within the meaning of subsection (2) sentence 1, in relation to the undertakings which depend on them. (4) Undertakings with superior market power in relation to small and medium-sized competitors shall not use their market power directly or indirectly to hinder such competitors in an unfair manner. An unfair hindrance within the meaning of sentence 1 exists in particular if an undertaking offers goods or services not merely occasionally below its cost price, unless there is an objective justification for this. In practice, the anti-discrimination rules of the GWB have given rise to the development of a rich case law, the details of which need not be restated here. The basic point is that under the rules against unfair competition no similar prohibition of discrimination in trade has or could have been developed. Given the contract autonomy of enterprises, also of market dominant enterprises, unfairness will not lie simply because an enterprise takes, as a matter of assessing its own interest, arbitrary business decisions vis-à-vis other enterprises, but only if, under the circumstances, a discriminatory act appears to be directly aimed at actually undermining and destroying a competitor's business. 118 More generally, unfair competition law may only negatively sort out competitive conduct, which, in addition to being harmful to individual enterprises (rather than to competition as such), is characterized by specific elements of unfairness.
119
Such elements, in particular the intent to directly and purposively hurt an individual competitor rather than to rival in competition on one's own merit, 120 are more typically associated with predatory practices. These, indeed, do represent a grey area between the law against unfair business practices and the antitrust laws. The existence of this grey area is due to the circumstance that, prior to the enactment of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition -and, in fact, prior to any meaningful antitrust legislation in Germany -, the courts had been faced with claims of unfair competition relating to price cutting practices which intentionally were directed at driving an individual competitor out of business. This again gave the courts the opportunity to extend their case law to practices of predatory price cutting, and to sales below costs, and to outlaw them in case that, due to follower conduct by other enterprises, such 118 122 In particular, up until 1998, Section 20 (4) GWB had reserved antitrust control of abusive conduct by market dominating enterprises to the administrative cartel authorities, and it was only once they had found an abuse, that a private law suit could be brought, based on the administrative decision. In addition, attribution of jurisdiction in civil matters seems to favor the application of unfair competition rules, see H. Köhler in R. Jacobs, W. Lindacher, O. Teplitzky, UWG-Großkommentar, Berlin 1995, § 1 annot. D 79. practices risk to result in putting competition altogether into jeopardy. 123 A case in point is the price war between two leading enterprises on a local market, which in all likelihood will result in the ruin of all smaller competitors. 124 This case law, in reality, is of rather limited scope. There are many justifications to sales below costs that are easily accepted, 125 and courts have taken care to put the accent on the structural anti-competitiveness of price cutting practices when holding them to be unfair. 126 In this context a bitter controversy may be noted, which was about whether the Act Against Unfair Competition may be relied upon to fight the mere risk that, due to predatory practices, a still competitive market may tip from being competitive to being dominated. 127 Ultimately, it has been brought to rest by, on the one hand, the reluctance of the courts to follow fully such a far-reaching proposition, 128 and, on the other, by intervention of the legislature. Indeed, in 1990, by adding a new paragraph 4, section 20 of the GWB has been deliberately extended to cover the battlefield between small and medium-sized enterprises and their more powerful, albeit not market dominating enterprises. 
132
The latter concept then has been generalized and used tentatively to control the exercise of market power of large retailers, who obliged suppliers to bear part of the retail costs, such reversal of roles being a way of obtaining undeserved advantages in competition on the retail side. 133 Competition on the merits even came to be qualified as a common concept of both the antitrust laws and the rules against unfair competition. This then, conversely, seemed to allow introducing unfair competition criteria into the antitrust laws as a way of giving some minimum content to the vague concepts of abuse of market power or, more specifically, to the concept of blocking-off rivals as a practice which cannot be accepted if indulged into by market dominating enterprises.
134
Surely enough, these approaches came under attack because of their structural rigidity. There are no pre-defined roles or functions of enterprises on the market. Rather, it is competition that defines and permanently redefines the roles enterprises may play on the market. 135 In addition, the notion of competition on the merit, whilst intuitively capturing the basic ideas of individualistic rivalry in the market place, in fact invites circular reasoning. 136 It is again competition and framework regulation of the market which determine merit and to whom to attribute it. 137 Therefore, it only rephrases the basic problem, which is to normatively evaluate what is fair in competition and what is not.
Probably, similar objections may be raised against modern attempts to define unfairness by reference to the market dysfunctionality of business practices. 138 Whilst they seek to separate the realm of the antitrust laws more clearly from that of the rules against unfair competition, they still mirror and even assert the interdependence, however indirect, of both set of rules as a matter of regulating competition in a free-enterprise, open market economy. . 146 Such, in fact, was the development in Germany, where protection under the rules on unfair competition was sought when antitrust law did not provide for relief from predatory practices by powerful competitors, and where, subsequently, more teeth where given to the antitrust rules, see supra III.1 c) text accompanying n. 120 et seq..
IV. Conclusion
A more principled argument for maintaining Member States' full authority of control of unfair practices of competition in business relations might again be based on a substantive distinction between the objectives and the implementation of the rules against anticompetitive and against unfair practices. In Germany, a major difficulty in determining the respective roles of both sets of market regulation has been due to the circumstance that the Act Against Restraints of Competition originally and basically had been founded on a systemoriented concept of freedom of competition, however controversial, imperfect and subject to instrumentalist revisions.
147
The Act Against Unfair Competition, by contrast, had its origins in protectionist notions of honest trade and ethical conduct, 148 and needed to be brought in line with modern concepts of competition-driven market development. Using the Act Against Unfair Competition to fight market-destructive practices with no protectionist objective in mind meant both refurbishing unfair competition law and pre-empting the antitrust laws. This was no easy task, and in a way, the antitrust laws reacted by an extension so as to pre-empt unfair competition rules in their turn.
In the Community, the situation is or has become different. Whilst its understanding of the rules of competition has become ever more instrumentalist, 149 and, in fact, favors forms of dynamic oligopolistic and of group competition, 150 national laws against unfair competition are or should be conceived and applied in a perspective of non-instrumentalist competition.
Their function is to set standards of respect for rival enterprises which, as a matter of stimulating all, rather than demotivating minor market participants, safeguard a minimum of mutual freedom of competition. Therefore, rather than closely following the competition Member States may, with respect to individual market conduct, and within the Community's framework of antitrust regulation, develop their own vision of a freedom-oriented market system, including the control of abuses of market power if it is exercised to destroy competition. This will of course result in some protection of competitors, but it is not protectionist for that matter.
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Competition is made of and by competitors. Granting each of them protection of their basic freedom of individual competition would seem to be complementary of, rather than contrary to the development of the Community's system of undistorted competition.
Complementarity of the anti-trust and the anti-unfair competition rules is by no means a new insight. However, its terms change over time, and it is as complex a complementarity as is competition itself. Indeed, given the kaleidoscopic nature of competition, unfair competition law quite naturally brings a variety of competition concerns into play, which are either outside the scope of the antitrust laws or have been marginalized by it. The areas examined here should have illustrated that point; it could have been made with respect to many other areas as well.
153
The change of terms of the relationship of complementarity has many reasons, which originate from both areas of law. However, whilst formerly the establishment of a system of undistorted competition on the basis of antitrust rules in the Community (or in Germany) led to a revision of the concepts of unfairness, the recent revision of the Community's (and of Germany's 154 ) antitrust rules may now require unfair competition law to develop, on the basis of the lessons taken, its own concepts of unfairness more independently. 
